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War, Military Leadership, and Democratic Civil-Military 
Relations: ‘The Stab in the Back’ — The Endurance of a 
Dubious Idea 
by Donald Abenheim 
 
It is currently fashionable—though misinformed and ultimately 
counterproductive—to insist that the Global War on Terror marks a 
complete departure from the political and strategic paradigms that 
obtained before 11 September 2001.  However novel the casual student 
of current events might find the irregular combat in the Hindu Kush 
and along the Tigris and Euphrates—in which Muslim fighters or Arab 
insurgents resist coalition special operations forces and mechanized 
infantry in protracted, low-intensity conflict—things look rather more 
familiar from an historically informed perspective.  Well-known civil-
military tensions are in evidence among senior political and military 
leaders and so, unfortunately, are the key myths and legends that 
surround their interactions with each other and with a pluralistic 
political and strategic culture.9 
King among such myths reigns the “stab in the back,”10 a legend in 
which armies seldom, if ever, suffer defeat on a battlefield for military 
reasons.  According to the “stab in the back” myth-makers, the fighting 
men and women have battled their way to the very edge of victory, or 
at least they can see success from their current position.  They are not 
thwarted by, say, faulty military leadership, defective command or 
                                                 
9 See: Carl von Clausewitz, On War  (Princeton, 1976), pp. 75ff; Gerhard Ritter, 
Staatskunst und Kriegshandwerk  Vol 1, (Munich, 1970), pp. 13ff.;  Gordon Craig,  
“The Political Leader as Strategist,” in Peter Paret et al eds. Makers of Modern 
Strategy 2d ed. (Princeton, 1986), pp. 481-509; 905-908;  Eliot Cohen, Supreme 
Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime (New York, 2002).  
10 On the German version of this idea, which forms the basis for this essay, see: 
Friedrich Hiller von Gaertringen, “’Dolchstoss’ Diskussion und ‘Dolchstosslegende’ 
im Wandel von vier Jahrzehnten” in  Geschichte und Gegenwartsbewusstein: 
Festschrift fuer Has Rothfels (Goettingen, 1963) , pp. 122-160;  Herfried Muenkler et 
al. Siegfrieden: Politik mit einem deutschen Mythos (Berlin, 1987).  
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morale, flawed strategy, or operational weaknesses arising from within 
an army itself.  Rather, defeat comes from behind one’s own lines, from 
enemies within the ranks and especially from the seats of political 
power and from far-away and fickle civilian society.  These unreliable 
quarters sap the fighting front by such means as the checks and 
balances of pluralistic government and the international system of 
states; pacifism; socialism; an undue emphasis on the needs of civil 
society even in wartime; or the role of religious minorities and other 
un-martial groups for whom profit or narrow self-interests rise above 
soldierly virtue, honor at arms and patriotic duty.  Whatever the 
mechanism, the non-military powers that be manage to stab the army in 
the back, stopping it short of triumph. 
The stab in the back legend, thus, serves both as a flourish of morning-
after blame deflection and as a chestnut of military mistrust of the 
political and social context of war and strategy.  To be sure, civil-
military strife attends all exercises of organized violence except 
perhaps Clausewitz’s total war, in which unrestrained armies, wield 
mutually annihilatory strategies by way of first blows that escalate into 
a perfect storm of violence.  Especially now that the United States finds 
itself in a deadly struggle with its various Islamic enemies in a war with 
few discernable front lines, civil-military issues have become more 
urgent in 2004.  The year’s headlines list some of the ingredients of a 
simmering calamity:  military prison torture scandals, ground force 
reservists’ involuntary tour extensions, and recriminations about 
missing armor plate from the battlefields of the Iraqi insurgency against 
the main supply routes of coalition forces.  While these episodes make 
the nightly news, the nature of this civil-military experience is poorly 
understood in this country and abroad.  Such misunderstandings in a 
time of strategic stress and political strain in the Global War on Terror 
augur difficulties to come in U.S. democratic civil-military relations 
and thus for the country’s alliance partners. 
The stab in the back as a unitary explanation for strategic reversals 
arises when the divergence between elite, expert proclamations of 
strategy and explanations of the character of war in the ideal tear 
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themselves to pieces amid reverses, setbacks, and rigors of actual war.11  
The basic problem is that how one imagines war must be waged at the 
outset (i.e. in the sense of an ideal form of war, or of Clausewitz on war 
on paper, as it were) differs greatly from how it is indeed waged in the 
face of the forces inherent to war and its political purpose.  Thus arises 
the cognitive dissonance between political and soldierly elites and 
various social groups that seek a remedy in myth and legend to shift 
responsibility to its improper locale.  There unfolds a kind of strategic 
transference of guilt in the sense of Freud, if such an assertion is 
possible in this context. 
This divergence of expectations and experience of the reality of war, 
the capacity of military proficiency to master all that might emerge 
from the face of battle, and the striking power and durability of military 
force in the face of setbacks all appear to exacerbate this strategic and 
civil-military “disconnect” in a democratic body politic.  Crucial here is 
the fear in the minds of policy-makers and especially of senior military 
figures that a pluralist civilian population will go soft in the face of the 
sacrifice of war. Less visible is the uncertain basis of military 
professionalism among its leading lights—that is, the tendency to 
distrust civilians as inherently less vested of such secondary virtues as 
bravery, loyalty, and self-sacrifice than are soldiers. 
Iraqi insurgents of 2004 recall their anti-British forbearers of the early 
1920s; they also might be identified with Tito-ite or Soviet partisans in 
1944. The present differs less still from certain pre-existing 
assumptions within politics and society about the capacity of strategic 
expertise and armed force to master a transformed kind of warfare, 
which bears rather too great a resemblance to the conflicts of imperial 
decline and European withdrawal from overseas outposts of the 
twentieth century. 
The weight of the past bears down on the civil-military thought and 
practice that surrounds this struggle in international as well as domestic 
politics. The rancor of the 2004 election, the discord in the international 
community, and the increasing domestic insecurity in the United States 
                                                 
11 On the dual nature of war in Clausewitz, On War, pp. 22-23; 78-89; on friction, pp. 
119-121; on psychology , pp. 186ff.  
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have historically explicable bases—and resolutions.  Indeed, the more 
one reflects about the first four years of policy and war in the twenty-
first century12—and as one necessarily turns a skeptical eye to the 
airless pronouncements of revolutionaries of military affairs and 
transformers of military doctrine and orders of battle—the more one 
senses that an historically informed comparison of trans-Atlantic civil-
military relations may offer some generalizations that illuminate rather 
less the content of change, but more what has remained unaffected. 
One must now treat how the soldier in the state within mass politics has 
come into fatal domestic conflict in the worst of times; moreover, one 
must explore the pathological response of myth, partisanship and the 
formation of legends in political culture in the face of crisis.  In this, the 
idea of the stab in the back remains a force of special virulence.  The 
risks and perils of the present strategic era demand that a new 
generation once more acquaint itself with the destructive career of this 
idea. 
 
The Old New Stab in the Back 
For example, an e-mail message, reportedly from an unnamed major of 
the U.S. Marine Corps, serving in the staff of the Multi-National Corps 
in Baghdad, made the rounds in the early fall of 2004.  In it, the author 
suggested that mainstream U.S. press accounts of the war after the war 
suffered from an undue pessimism, if not an outright defeatism.  That 
is, as this correspondent from the front put it in the title of his message: 
“Doom & Gloom about Iraq’s future….I don’t see it where I am 
                                                 
12 For example of writings that suggested change in the 21st century based on Israeli 
military experience, see Martin v. Creveld, The Transformation of War (New York, 
1991). Journalistic accounts of the 2003-2004 Iraq war widely read despite their 
tendentious tone: Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack, (New York, 2004); Seymour 
Hersh, Chain of Command, (New York, 2004) . The manner in which the advocates 
of the so-called revolution in military affairs or so-called military transformation 
sought to bend strategic reality to their pre-conceived notions of politics, technology 
and war comprises a subject for fertile inquiry that lies outside the scope of this 
essay. 
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sitting.”13  The major continued:  “Everything Americans believe about 
Iraq is simply perception filtered through one's latent prejudices ….”14  
One won’t know the truth until one actually stands on the banks of the 
two ancient rivers and faces the reality of the occupation and the 
insurgency—and incidentally, the former is proceeding well against the 
latter with rebuilt schools, repaired sewers, and flourishing commerce.  
These successes shine beyond those areas of die-hard Sunni and non-
Iraqi resistance by “dead enders” of the Ba’athist stay-behind 
organization and the thuggish decapitators led by the Jordanian Au 
Musab Al-Zargawi.  But the folks at home only hear the bad news. 
The remedy, according to the major, is more reality for everyone.  To 
amplify his point, he invoked a John Wayne film about the Vietnam 
War, which, in all likelihood, was made before he was even born.  “If 
you haven’t seen, or don’t remember, the John Wayne movie, The 
Green Berets, you should watch it this weekend.  Pay special attention 
to the character of the reporter, Mr. Beckwith (the Journalist in the 
movie).  His characters [sic] experience is directly related to the 
situation here.  You’ll have a different perspective on Iraq after the 
movie is over.”15  Indeed, in this cult-classic flourish of pro-war 
propaganda that hit U.S. theaters the same year as the Tet Offensive, 
the once nay-saying newsman Beckworth comes to recognize the 
validity of the U.S. role in Vietnam once he sees the actual war through 
Colonel Kirby’s combat-honed eyes.  Thus apprised of the truth, he is 
freed of the baleful influence of Mario Savio, Jerry Rubin, Abbie 
Hoffman, or any of the other hippies, yippies, free-speechers, sitters-in, 
or collegiate malcontents who prefer free love to a free South Vietnam 
and who foment domestic dissatisfaction to undermine the vital U.S. 
mission in Southeast Asia. 
In contrast to Beckworth’s salutary transformation, the fourth estate 
today persists in its seditious negativity, which provides “fodder for our 
enemies to use against us and against the vast majority of Iraqis who 
                                                 
13 A copy of the text of the e-mail appears at: http://realpolitik.us/archives/001909.php 
or http://marx.mine.nu/the_truth.htm , both sites last checked on 17 MAR 2005. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid. The character is actually called George Beckworth, and he was played in the 
movie by David Janssen. 
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want their new government to succeed.”16  Thus, the major concludes, 
U.S. national morale is put at risk by “sensationalized stories hyped by 
media giants, whose #1 priority is advertising income” and journalistic 
partisanship that ditches the truth in favor of left-wing prejudice, “as 
Dan Rather and CBS News have so aptly demonstrated.”17  The man on 
the street should leave soldiers alone to do their difficult work—or, 
better yet, suit up and do his part for the country and the cause or at 
least get some real facts from real experts before he ventures an 
opinion.  The implicit truth here is simple:  Enthusiastic and preferably 
unquestioning support represents the highest duty of a citizen toward 
the professional soldier.  If the civilian falters in this role, he stabs the 
soldier in the back and the country in the heart with his insufficient 
patriotism. 
It is striking that the writer, fully involved in this conflict that purports 
to be unlike anything before it, should reach for parallels in an old 
movie about a by-gone war.  There may be something to be said about 
the hegemonic iconography of Hollywood and the immortal John 
Wayne in the national mind within the image of war.  More salient, 
however, is the persistence of traditional perceptions of the civil-
military past and present among professional soldiers, including doubts 
about the strategic efficacy of democracy and its institutions, as well as 
an ideal of war divorced from, or superior to, civil society.  The e-mail 
and the circumstances in which the author wrote it—and thousands of 
Americans presumably read it—suggest just how little has changed, 
even since 11 September 2001, from the civil-military record of the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries.  While a noteworthy Jewish 
broadcaster of a formerly leading television news organization (and 
bete noir of the American right) plays the traditional back-stabber in 
the civil-military cast of characters of this marine’s e-mail, a long-dead 
film star in an imaginary role bulks large as an arbiter of strategic truth 
in a war of which the author likely has no direct experience other than 
in partisan myth and legend.  Yet the myth and legend of feckless 
                                                 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid. The reference to Dan Rather refers to the apparently empty assertions in the 
midst of the 2004 election campaign as to President George W. Bush’s gaps of 
service in the Alabama Air National Guard in the early 1970s. 
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civilians losing the Vietnam War, and particularly the specter of the 
stab in the back, resonate with today’s soldier.  The chimera of the 
perfidious civilian has survived the years to breathe more flame into 
new-old civil-military tensions. 
 
Soldier and Politics 
The same flame stoked the Third Reich—and the Holocaust.  In this 
connection, another set of movie images merits consideration.  Within 
the soaring walls of a new multiplex cinema on the Potsdamer Platz, 
only a couple of hundred meters from the remnants of Hitler’s bunker, 
young Berliners of 2004 could see the film, Der Untergang,18 a 
historically precise (within its limits) dramatization of the Nazi 
leadership’s last weeks in World War II.  On the one hand, the events 
of April and May 1945 seems a very long time ago.  The depressing 
locale is now mostly obscured by low-rise office buildings of post-
modern, granite-and-steel design.  Bustling, if middle-brow, retail and a 
few official houses now fill the space that comprised the gardens of the 
chancellery, open to the nearby Tiergarten, which later became the 
glacis of the Berlin Wall.  A few hundred meters beyond to the north, 
in the direction of the Brandenburg Gate and the Pariser Platz, now 
stands the controversial Holocaust memorial. On the other hand, the 
movie offers a very current account of the climax of the civil-military 
misfortune caused by the doctrine of the stab in the back in twentieth-
century Central Europe; this idea that became a dogma, in turn, formed 
one of the central tenets of National Socialism in its historical self-
justification as well as in the civil-military structures of the Nazi state.  
The film depicts the final disintegration of national command and the 
waging of war in the worst case; that is, when the key Nazi 
assumptions about the German defeat in 1918 and the civil-military 
ideals of totalitarian ideological and state power finally crashed to earth 
in the middle of a devastated Berlin.  The ultimate union of the most 
                                                 
18 Joachim Fest, Bernd Eichinger, Der Untergang: Das Filmbuch (Reinbek, 2004); the 
foregoing film was based on: Joachim Fest, Der Untergang: Hitler und das Ende d. 
III. Reiches (Berlin, 2003); Traudl Junge, Bis zur letzten Stunde: Hitlers Sekraeterin 
erzaehlt ihr Leben (Munich, 2002).  
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fanatical of National Socialists, soldiers and total war in its most 
absolute form leaves a strong impression on the viewer. 
This catastrophe of the soldier in the age of mass politics and of 
command in war in the era of the nation state raises the issue of the 
putative unity of command that existed in the old regime (i.e. before 
1800) and that broke apart with the advent of the nation-state in a 
bureaucratic and mass political epoch from the end of the eighteenth 
century to the dawn of the twentieth century.  This phenomenon of 
European state, society, and arms requires elucidation as the prelude to 
the civil-military relations of total war and what has followed thereafter 
into the present era.19  The cultish obeisance to unity of command at the 
highest level in totalitarian regimes arose more or less logically in the 
evolution of this institution from the early modern era to the present—
and is, therefore, highly germane for the subject at hand. 
The manner in which the military profession became disconnected from 
its dynastic political and social basis in the course of revolutionary and 
Napoleonic era and then secured a professional and national foundation 
in the industrial age thereafter enabled skeptics, doubters, and critics in 
uniform—and their allies in mufti—to conceive the idea of the stab in 
the back as the guiding principle of civil-military relations in the 
modern era.  They insisted that the home front, the civilian realm of 
society as well as civilian makers of policy, invoking their conventions, 
convictions, and constitutions, refused to allow soldiers to fight in the 
manner appropriate to the so-called timeless verities of war.  These 
realities of the battlefield, its masters said, stood above and beyond 
those of civil society and the rule of law.  The army professed to know 
best how to preserve and protect the state and the nation.  Thus, the 
dynastic and aristocratic disdain for the lesser estates in society that had 
been visible in the civil-military relations of the old regime and the 
revolutionary period underwent a transformation whereby professional 
                                                 
19  On the role of theory and military professionalism as visible in the career of the 
Swiss Henri de Jomini, who became the leading light of this dominant school of 
strategy in the 19th century, see:  Jon Shy, “Jomini” in Makers of  Modern Strategy  
2d ed. pp. 143-185. On the civil-military transformation of politics and society in the 
19th century, see: Michael Howard, War in European History (Oxford, 1976) pp. 
75ff.  
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soldiers of the nation-state reacted to the rise of mass politics with a 
contrived mish-mash of pseudo-aristocratic professional attitudes that 
they applied to a new political cosmos of the nation, an industrialized 
society of growing class conflict, and break-neck social changes. 
In its extreme form, the doctrine of the stab in the back suggested that 
civilians caused defeat by dint of half-heartedness, subterfuge, 
calumny, and dishonesty of the worst kind, while the soldier selflessly 
gave his life for national survival and glory.  Already by the middle of 
the nineteenth century, this idea had taken hold in various forms in such 
countries as Prussia/Germany, France, Great Britain, and the United 
States.20  This idea later became a dominant principle of political and 
strategic thought in the twentieth century as the age of total war among 
the leading nation-states unfolded with brutal results.21 
Nazis thinkers joined the myth of national unity in 1914 with the 
putative stab in the back for a single explanation of defeat in 1918 and 
then sought to organize party and state institutions against the enemies 
within on a comprehensive scale.  The dual-pillar concept of party and 
armed forces meshed with the ideological organization of state and 
                                                 
20 On Prussia/Germany from 1848, see: Gordon Craig, Politics of the Prussian Army 
(Oxford, 1964), pp. 217ff; Manfred Messerschmidt, “Die politische Geschichte der 
preussisch-deutschen Armee” in MGFA eds. Handbuch zur deutschen 
Militaergeschichte (Munich, 1979), vol. II, pp. 9ff.; on the impact of French colonial 
warfare on civil-military relations, see. Douglas Porch, “Bugeaud, Gallieni, Lyautey: 
The Development of French Colonial Warfare,” in  Makers of Modern Strategy, pp. 
376-407; for the example these ideas in the thought of the US military theorist, 
Emory Upton, see: idem. The Military Policy of the United States  (New York, 1968) 
pp. vii-xv;  Russell Weigley, Towards an American Army: Military Thought from 
Washington to Marshall (New York, 1962), pp. 100-126;  on the impact of British 
colonial warfare on “stab in the back” thinking in the UK, see Hew Strachan, The 
Politics of the British Army (Oxford, 1996), pp. 74-117; 161-194. 
21 On the impact of the World War I on German politics and society: Michael Howard, 
The First World War (Oxford, 2002); in greater detail, Wolfgang Mommsen, 
Imperial Germany, 1867-1918 (London/New York, 1995); Steffen Bruendel, 
Volksgemeinschaft oder Volksstaat: die “Ideen von 1914” und die Neuordnung 
Deutschlands im EWK  (Berlin, 2003);  Roger Chickering, Imperial Germany and 
the Great War, 1914-1918  (Cambridge, 1998);  Heinz Hagenluecke, Deutsche 
Vaterlandspartei: die nationale Rechte am Ende des Kaiserreiches (Duesseldorf, 
1997).   
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society for total war, the creation of an internal security organization, 
and even genocide served to preclude a future stab in back by a 
geopolitical and racial revolution of conquest.  While the Hitler regime 
initially refrained from as drastic measures as embraced by the Soviets 
in the subordination of the army to the party, by 1944, the national 
leadership had reached a similar posture, in which mass mobilization, 
ideological purity, all reached a furious climax in the last months of the 
war.22  These measures did no good, and rather meant the needless 
deaths of hundreds of thousands.  
 
Strategic Idealism Gone Wrong 
Attendant to the stab in the back, there also persists an image of an 
ideal form of strategy and military institutions that are liberated from 
the messiness of pluralistic politics and also able to render combat like 
a sand-table exercise, without any of the liabilities and distractions 
inherent to modern societies or to the frictional nature of war itself.  
The men and women who hold such misapprehensions about war and 
strategy are usually neither stupid nor malevolent; typically, they arrive 
at their positions by way of a well-intentioned, if unattainable, strategic 
idealism.  The aspirations to a more perfect warfare is part of the 
intellectual history of the stab-in-the-back legend, with proponents 
whose theories and practices date back at least two centuries. 
For example, in 1951, after President Harry Truman relieved General 
Douglas MacArthur amid the Korean War, the five-star general 
testified to Congress about strategic theory within his conception of the 
soldier and politics visible in a kind of ideal form of war:  “There is no 
substitute for victory.”23  He put forward an encapsulated version of the 
                                                 
22 The Nazis depicted the 20 July 1944 plot as a failed redux of the events of the 
summer and fall of 1918, but this comparison fell wide of the mark.  See: Peter 
Hoffmann  The History of the German Resistance, 1933-1945 (Cambridge, Mass, 
1977), pp. 507ff.; Karl Heinrich  Peter ed. 20 Juli: Spiegelbild einer Verschwoerung 
(Stuttgart, 1961).  
23 Walter Millis, American Military Thought (Indianopolis/New York, 1966), pp. 481ff;  
D. Clayton James, The Years of MacArthur: Triumph and Disaster, 1945-1964  
(Boston, 1985), pp. 621-640.   
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U.S. way of war, namely a strategy of annihilation that had been 
present in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and that formed an 
essential condition for the adherents of the stab in the back to prosper.  
In particular, once war began, MacArthur asserted, conflict became 
solely the realm of the soldier-expert.  Civilian makers of policy simply 
had to await the final outcome, lest they gum up the war-making 
proposition with their treaties, conventions, constituents, and qualms. 
MacArthur presented himself as the embodiment of the U.S. military 
ethos for an adoring and assertive Republican Congress enraged by 
Truman’s Euro-centric strategy of limited war and undue credence to 
British reservations about coalition strategy in Northeast Asia.  To 
MacArthur’s congressional audience, this policy of half-measures, 
tantamount to a stab in the back, had been rendered unbearable by the 
president’s sacking of the war hero right at the moment when the 
United States might secure a major victory in Korea (and not just some 
grey treaty that left half the peninsula in Communist hands).  In the 
minds of his devotees, MacArthur’s Inchon offensive had brilliantly 
restored the initiative to the West, despite the ultimately deleterious 
role that this operational advance played in the strategic near-collapse 
of the UN campaign a few months later, in the face of the Chinese 
assault across the Yalu river. 
Though Truman may have seemed to his critics to have stabbed 
MacArthur in the back, in fact, MacArthur’s inability to grasp the 
global strategic dimension of the war beyond the operational realm—
linked with his partisan intervention in favor of the Asia-firster 
Republicans through his open criticism of Truman’s containment 
strategy—had doomed his political efficacy as a commander.  
MacArthur refused to consider the Korean War within the context of all 
U.S. interests in the Cold War.  One might argue—though not very 
convincingly with the domestic and international bills for World War II 
fresh on the president’s desk—that, from a military perspective, a war 
with China would have been winnable in 1951, before Mao Zedong 
solidified Communist rule in the country and before the Chinese 
successfully detonated their first nuclear bomb.  But politically, such a 
war was neither desirable nor plausible to Harry S Truman.  The 
U.S./UN coalition fighting in Korea teetered on collapse in 1951; 
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drastically expanding the operation over the thirty-eighth parallel likely 
would have pushed it over the edge, with ramifications for the Cold 
War balance however the United States proceeded with the war.  This 
difference of opinion between the two leaders quickly revealed its most 
fundamental point of contention, namely civilian control of policy and 
strategy.  It ended with the primacy of (civilian) politics and, therefore, 
with General MacArthur’s ouster.24 
MacArthur’s idea that war somehow existed outside or beyond the 
realm of domestic politics and alliance strategy was surely the common 
property of his generation, although many Americans today 
erroneously ascribe this theory solely to him.  Like many of his 
contemporaries, MacArthur would have encountered such notions in 
the course of his own military education.  That is, MacArthur, whether 
he was conscious of it or not, took a page first from the writings of the 
Swiss theorist Antoine Henri de Jomini,25 who postulated grand tactics 
of a single offensive style as the highest form of strategy.  Jomini 
further theorized that generals best knew how to fight wars and whose 
theories paid little heed to the civil-military implications of 
revolutionary and Napoleonic warfare. 
In similar stead stands the Prussian-German chief of the general staff 
and theorist Helmuth von Moltke,26 whose doctrines in the first half of 
the nineteenth century propagated the idea that policy should bow to 
the needs of strategy in a narrow sense. In Moltke’s ideal political and 
social system, once the artillery spoke, men in frock coats should 
silently await the outcome of battle before they raised their voices once 
more.  He asserted that diplomacy and domestic politics should allow 
the commander free rein to secure victory—in other words, these other 
                                                 
24 John W. Spanier, The Truman-MacArthur Controversy and the Korean War 
(Harvard, 1959); D. Clayton James et al. Refighting the Last War: Command and 
Crisis in Korea, 1950-1953 (New York, London, 1993), pp. 196ff. 
25 See citations in note 12.  
26 Stig Foerster, ed. Moltke: vom Kabinettskrieg zum Volkskrieg (Bonn, 1992), pp. 630-
632. 
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(and somehow separate) political goals should remains subordinate to 
the military purpose.27 
Moltke’s writings formed the basis for the education of generations of 
military professionals and represent a milestone in the “stab in the 
back” phenomenon.  His writings perpetuated a kind of skewed civil-
military dogma, which established the basis in the latter part of the 
nineteenth century and the early twentieth century for the further 
perversion of his ideas amid the flowering of the stab-in-the-back 
syndrome in its full virulence once the misfortunes and yet greater trials 
of total war befell central Europe. 
The similarity of Moltke’s ideas and those of his U.S. contemporary, 
soldier-theorist Emory Upton, suggest themselves for the theme at 
hand.28  Upton gave a voice to the disgruntled U.S. military 
professional at the end of the nineteenth century, as the United States 
cut its standing army following the Civil War and otherwise asserted its 
civilian interests at the expense of the fighting men.  Upton further 
spoke for those in search of a modernized, expansible army with 
modern bureaucratic brains on a machine-age European model—and 
with a professionalized military cadre in charge.  He deplored the U.S. 
civil-military system as wasteful, venal, corrupt, enfeebled, 
unaccommodating of military genius, and apt to extend conflict 
artificially to gain political capital at the cost of soldiers’ blood.  In this 
connection, the U.S. Army before 1861 and especially thereafter in the 
                                                 
27 Ibid. On this issue generally, See Gordon Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army, 
(New York, 1964), pp. 160ff.  This dogma emerged in the wake of civil-military 
contentions with Otto von Bismarck in the 1864, 1866, and 1870-71 Prussian 
campaigns of German unity.  In these years and the decade that followed, the needs 
of Prussian-German diplomacy for national unity within the system of European 
states collided with strategic-operational dictates of the grand battle against Prussia’s 
foes. Conflicting goals of policy and strategy diverged sharply amid the paradigmatic 
civil-military contest between the chancellor and the chief of the general staff about 
the battlefields of unification ( i.e. the fortifications of Düppel in Schlewsig-Holstein 
in 1864, the aftermath of Königgraetz in Bohemia and Austria in 1866, and the siege 
of Paris in 1871) and the need for a stable international system once the fighting had 
come to a halt. Of more recent origin, Michael Schmid, Der “Eiserne Kanzler” und 
die Generaele  (Paderborn/Muenchen, 2003).  
28  See works in note 13.   
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decade of the 1870s, had been stabbed in the back by the civilians in 
the first instance by misconceived combat that wasted lives and 
treasure; and in the second instance, by the executive and legislative 
branches that then allowed the U.S. armed forces to languish in 
peacetime. 
When the world war came in 1914 the civil-military predisposition to 
the “stab in the back” thus existed on all sides and quickly became an 
organizing idea, especially for the continental powers.29  The results 
were swift and doubly fatal in their effect when compared to the 
nineteenth century.  Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg  
upheld the political influence of strategic restraint so long as the idea of 
civil peace endured in a Germany united within against its foes in the 
east and west.  However, the strategic reverses suffered by the Central 
Powers in the stalemate on the western front and the limited efficacy of 
the eastern campaigns until 1917 fostered the polarization and 
radicalization of domestic politics.  This political chaos, in turn, cleared 
the path in 1916 for the rise of the 3. Oberste Heeresleitung.30  Thus 
collapsed the remaining restraints of a policy of moderation as 
domestic politics paid horrific tribute to the machine age battle field.  
The army sought to reorganize and rationalize the fighting front, the 
economy and society in a technocratic reform from the ground up to 
recapture the killing fields for the central powers.  The victors in the 
East of 1914, Paul von Hindenburg and Erich Ludendorff,31 emerged as 
the dual figures of total war in the ideal, in which ideological 
mobilization went hand in hand with national Gleichschaltung of 
society and economy for victory. 
                                                 
29 Konrad Jarausch , The Enigmatic Chancellor: Bethmann Hollweg and the Hubris of 
Imperial Germany  (New Haven/London, 1973), pp. 308ff; Holger Afflerbach, 
Falkenhayn: Politisches Denken und Handeln im Kaiserreich  (Munich, 1994), pp. 
190ff.  
30 Gerhard Ritter, Staatskunst und Kriegshandwerk  Vol. III, pp. 251ff.; Chickering, 
Imperial Germany and the Great War, pp.65ff. 
31  Walter Rauscher, Hindenburg: Feldmarschall und Reichspraesident (Vienna, 1997);  
Wolfgang Vennohr, Ludendorff: Legende und Wirklichkeit (Berlin/Frankfurt, 1993);  
Franz Uhle-Wettler, Erich Ludendorff in seiner Zeit (Berg, 1995).   
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The culmination of this effort, which in key aspects formed the pattern 
for Nazi practice two decades later, lay in the strategic-operational 
blow against the West in March 1918.  The coup de main widely 
missed its mark, as the local successes failed to result in the strategic 
collapse envisioned by the German side and instead blew back against 
the exhausted Central Powers.  The general defeat followed quickly at 
the end of the summer of 1918, culminating in an armistice negotiated 
while the army was still in the field, which fostered the legend in its 
final, most vicious form.   
The search for the causes of the war and the final collapse of imperial 
Germany began in parliament a year after the armistice in the chaos of 
defeat and international banishment for the Germans.  Quickly, the 
question, to say nothing of the various answers, assumed the 
atmospherics of fierce partisanship.  The civil-military results proved 
disastrous for the course of modern central European history.  
Hindenburg’s testimony to the parliamentarians—to the effect that a 
British general had told him that the army had been stabbed in the 
back—followed a reactionary pattern common to his kind since 1848.  
This well-honed conspiracy theory saw the roots of defeat at home 
among parliamentarians, socialists, and Jews.32  Weakling civilians had 
failed to live up to the lofty strategic goals of the 3. OHL.  The field 
marshal’s testimony provided millions of returning soldiers with a hate-
filled rationale for defeat that, in Hindenburg’s upside-down world, was 
snatched from the jaws of imminent victory by a civilian society that 
had lost its nerve. 
The onus must rest anywhere other than on him and those in field-grey 
and carmine-red facings, who are the myth’s heroes.  Hindenburg’s 
thesis on the German defeat in World War I shifted the blame well 
away from those who had truly wrecked Germany’s alliance politics 
and isolated the country, hoped too much for the operational level of 
war to revolutionize strategy, and who generally misunderstood the 
requirements of a modern nation-at-arms to wage total war as 
effectively as the western democracies had done.  The German army 
thus emerged from defeat in 1918 with its reputation in tact, if 
                                                 
32 Rauscher, Hindenburg, pp. 211-212.  See also citations in note 3.  
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unreflected.  However, Hindeburg’s violation of the historical record 
provided the intellectual basis from which Ludendorff’s political allies 
of the 1920s and 1930s set about constructing a political and social 
order incapable of stabbing the army in the back—and disinclined to 
stop the legend from proceeding to its murderous extremes in the Third 
Reich. 
 
The Present and its Dangers  
Although the stab in the back suffers from its association with anti-
democratic thinkers and practitioners, and despite the myth’s lack of 
factual support in any historical case study, the idea of the stab in the 
back has not been dormant in the United States, even in recent years.  
Indeed, the Indochina war in the popular imagination of more than a 
generation later seems wholly explained by the stab-in-the-back 
paradigm; the anonymous marine’s e-mail shows just how lively this 
strategic misunderstanding of the Vietnam War remains all these 
decades later.  The election campaign of 2004 contained the revival of 
the polemics and vitriol of the late 1960s and early 1970s and lost 
nothing in comparison to the ill feeling and name-calling that 
surrounded Hindenburg’s testimony to the Reichstag in November 
1919. 
All too many observers seemed to accept at face value a 
misrepresentation of the strategic realities of 1967 and also of 1991 as 
regards the termination of the first Gulf War on what in the minds of 
some had been an incomplete basis.  That is, George H. W. Bush had 
stabbed General Norman Schwarzkopf in the back when “the 
politicians” halted the ground and foreclosed the final decisive battle 
against Saddam Hussein’s Republican Guard.  Such an un-substituted 
victory would have been the overture to the liberation of Iraq.  Instead, 
the coalition settled for the lesser measure of what it wanted in the first 
place: Iraqi soldiers out of sovereign Kuwait.  This imagined, stabbed-
in-the-back formation of legend in 1993 must now appear to many as 
being somewhat more sobering and troubling from the perspective of 
late-2004 and the difficulties of the actual liberation of Iraq. 
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Since 11 September 2001, the stab in the back has reasserted itself as a 
leading idea in the political debates of the United States and its allies; 
the civilian leaders, particularly those figures who would restrict the 
armed forces with standard procedures or international law, find 
themselves painted as part of the problem.  Such a development should 
hardly be surprising.  Various critics of all stripes sought political profit 
by questioning those responsible for failures of defense against the 
September 11th assaults, just as detractors of Franklin D. Roosevelt and 
of U.S. defense policy before World War II came to the United States 
ascribed the Japanese attack on U.S. Pacific forces to the president’s 
subterfuge and sleight of hand in the years 1938-1941.33 
In a similar vein, critics in the United States have asked:  Who let 
Osama bin Laden escape from the Afghan badlands of Tora Bora at the 
close of 2001? Who was to blame that the successful lightning 
maneuver operation of the initial campaign in Iraq during the spring of 
2003 presently became bogged down in a botched occupation and 
incipient insurgency from the summer of 2003 onward?  In this latter 
connection, supporters of the war can assert that ex-Army Chief of 
Staff Eric Shinseki stabbed Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul 
Wolfowitz in the back (or in the front) with the controversy over the 
size of the post-conflict constabulary force in Iraq.  Conversely, 
Shinseki can be seen by his critics as a politicized, partisan back-
stabber against the democratically legitimated civilian control of the 
U.S. armed forces.  Meanwhile, polemicists cast Jacques Chirac and 
Jacques de Villepin as back-stabbers of the liberators of 1918 and 1944 
while also being egotists of appeasement and a statecraft of anti-U.S. 
spheres of interest.  The stab-in-the-back legend can accommodate 
most personalities and situations.  Perhaps it endures as a chestnut of 




                                                 
33 Justus Doenecke Storm on the Horizon: the Challenge to American Intervention, 
1939-1941 (Lanham, 2000).   
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Conclusions 
An observer of late-2004, transfixed by scenes of carnage in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, might ask what all of this history portends for the present 
and future.  Plainly we are elsewhere than the Fuehrerbunker in the 
spring of 1945 or in the emperor’s headquarters at Spa, Belgium, in the 
fall of 1918.  Why bother at all, since we live in a brave new world of 
counter-terror amid a revolution in military affairs that has rendered 
moot all that has gone before?  Are we not at a similar point in the 
development of organized violence as in the early 1950s, when 
observers claimed that the thermonuclear bomb had rendered the 
history of war quite silly for serious minds?  But just as the assumption 
that nuclear weapons had transformed the face of war beyond all 
recognition proved false within a brief time, so too are the claims that 
the post-11 September 2001 world has departed wholly from all that 
has come before. 
While there has grown up among some in the political class of the 
United States a fondness for imperial warfare amid the Global War on 
Terrorism—complete with highly romanticized notions of the pax 
Britannica—this neglected dimension of the stab-in-the-back requires 
more reflection.  The British scholar Hew Strachan has pointed out the 
manner in which warfare in the empire politicized soldiers in a very 
distinct manner.34  The model was the British soldiers in the Indian 
army and the civil-military conflicts of the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries, which were later duplicated in such other imperial garrisons 
as Palestine, Malaya, and Borneo.  The soldiers of these distant 
campaigns carried their partisan ethos into the domestic politics of the 
United Kingdom, as likewise happened with France and the United 
States in the 1950s and even until the present day. 
Today’s stab in the back civil-military legend-making and the shifting 
of blame derives from a misunderstanding of the nature of war, the 
over-estimation of tactical operational outcomes of the battlefield too 
narrowly defined, and the incapacity by professional soldiers or defense 
civilians to address the requirements of national mobilization and the 
mechanisms of pluralism in the age of national and even imperial 
                                                 
34 Strachan, Politics of the British Army, pp. 74ff.  
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warfare.  In other words, the same misconceptions continue to sustain 
the myth.  In light of the record of the past, however, one might hope 
for a steeper upward slope in the proverbial learning curve. The 
consequences of these failures have been truly appalling in terms of 
strategic error and wasted lives. 
Professional soldiers must be aware of the dangers inherent in bad 
habits and bad history amid the needs of military leadership in the 
present.  The past offers plenty of guidance; the future rather depends 
on the thoughtful consideration of it. For one example, military 
planners in and out of uniform with a modicum of historical 
understanding must recognize the limitations of strategy conceived 
solely in strategic operational terms.  There is always more to a war 
than the belligerents’ battlefield capabilities.  More broadly, planners 
must understand the limits of annihilationist strategy, particularly as 
actual combat develops and changes in its military means and political 
ends.  Civil-military relations will remain a source of tension, 
particularly in times of national peril.  The United States’ democratic 
institutions can continue to withstand such crises, as long as they are 
not “secured” or streamlined beyond all recognition in an over-hasty 
response to reversals on the frontlines.   
Similarly, the stab in the back is always there, promising a guiltless 
association with the inevitable setbacks in and of combat.  Military and 
political thinkers alike must resist the lure of the stab in the back if they 
are to secure the full fighting power in a democracy.  To separate the 
armed forces from the social and political context at least serves to 
weaken the overall effort by disconnecting the elements of the U.S. 
system of governance and policymaking.  The ensuing polemics 
certainly do little to allow us to wage the war more effectively.  At 
worst, the stab in the back myth launches the polity down a steep and 
perilous path that leads away from the liberal democratic ideals and 
practices at this nation’s heart.  Rather than a promiscuous assignment 
of blame, the present requires a very sober, realistic assessment of vital 
ends and precious means, all of which is ill-served by a recourse to a 
manner of thought discredited by the past.  
